

**“It is the cardinal aim of an insurgent movement, by using guerrilla techniques, tactics and strategy, to render a superior army incapable of saving the state. The basic winning formula for an insurgency is as follows: if an insurgent movement can, at a cost which is indefinitely acceptable, impose costs on a government which are not indefinitely acceptable, then, while losing every battle, it is winning the war” (9-10).**

“The whole point of these sorts of incidents is to get the army thoroughly committed to areas of minor concern with the result that it gets tied down there. This course leaves the base areas, that is to say, the developed, populated areas of the countryside, open to penetration until, suddenly, the army finds it has lost them” (12).

“[T]he priority of attack should be against the insurgents’ infrastructure, not against their guerrilla units” (12). Gen. Creighton Abrams “understood completely the necessity of breaking the insurgency’s infrastructure” (14).

Sir Robert G. K. Thompson, in Ronald Haycock, ed., *Regular Armies and Insurgency* (1979)