


I'M TELLING YOU, AS AN OLD 'NAM HAND, I'VE SEEN THIS MOVIE...



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WE'RE IN THE MIDDLE OF A CIVIL WAR. THE ENEMY ARE HIGHLY MOTIVATED NATIONALISTS WHO WANT TO KICK OUT FOREIGN POWERS...



...AND REPLACE AN INEPT, DEEPLY CORRUPT CENTRAL GOVERNMENT! HOW IS THIS NOT VIETNAM ALL OVER AGAIN?



www.dreamsbury.com


UM...NOT SURE. MY COLLEGE DIDN'T OFFER HISTORY.





“Let’s declare ourselves winners and get the hell out.”

October 24, 1969



**In 1966, Senator George Aiken of Vermont:
the United States should simply
"declare victory and get out."**

Pacification (“the other war”)

- “The body count does not have much to do with the outcome of the war. Some of the things I do think are important are that we preempt or defeat the enemy’s military operations and eliminate or render ineffective the major portion of his guerrillas and his infrastructure—the political, administrative and paramilitary structure on which the whole
- movement depends.” (Creighton Abrams)



Hearts and Minds



“It is far more significant
that we neutralize
one thousand of these
guerrillas and infra-structure
than kill 10,000
North Vietnamese soldiers.”
(Creighton Abrams)



“One War” Targets

- ↪ Supply
- ↪ Recruitment
- ↪ Infiltration
- ↪ Propaganda
- ↪ Main forces
- ↪ Local forces
- ↪ Guerrillas
- ↪ Infrastructure
- ↪ Transportation
- ↪ Bases
- ↪ Lines of communications
- ↪ Political cadres
- ↪ Administrative cadres
- ↪ Population support

The Nixon Years: Peace or Exit?

Wanted:

- + military pressure
- + conciliatory negotiating terms in new negotiations
- + diplomatic pressure on the Soviet Union
(encourage their North Vietnamese to negotiate)

To buy time with Americans:

- + withdraw forces from Vietnam = Vietnamization

South Vietnam needed to develop:

- + the combat capability
- + logistics and planning capacity
- + leadership at the national and military levels

November 3, 1969: “In the previous administration, we Americanized the war in Vietnam. In this administration, we are Vietnamizing the search for peace.” (President Nixon)

1959	760	243,000
1960	900	243,000
1961	3205	243,000
1962	11,300	243,000
1963	16,300	243,000
1964	23,300	514,000
1965	184,300	642,500
1966	385,300	735,900
1967	485,600	798,700
1968	536,100 31,000 dead	820,000
1969	475,200	897,000
1970	334,600	968,000
1971	156,800	1,046,250
1972	24,200	1,048,000
1973	50	1,110,000

Public peace talks in Paris = propaganda for both sides.

Productive negotiations = needed to be in private.

August 4, 1969:

National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger = first private session with the North Vietnamese.

Met with Politburo member Le Duc Tho intermittently over the following months = no apparent progress.

Would “short, sharp blows” by air and naval forces advance talks?

+ American casualties on the decline


+ anti-war movement still powerful

+ no satisfactory political-military solution in sight

= “silent majority” speech (November 3, 1969), rallying the American people toward patient support for a protracted war.

= dual strategy of Vietnamization and negotiation.

Sec. of Defense Robert McNamara





Daniel Ellsberg





PENTAGON
PAPERS II:
THE WIKILEAKS

®

AS USUAL, THE SEQUEL
DOESN'T COME CLOSE
TO THE ORIGINAL.

YEAH... I MISS
VIETNAM-ERA
DECEPTION AND
OUTRAGE!

ROGERS

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March 1970 Prince Norodom Sihanouk in Cambodia replaced by Lon Nol

Demanded the North Vietnamese withdraw from base camps along South Vietnamese border.

North Vietnamese instead extended presence toward the west.

Nixon ordered US-South Vietnamese “incursion” into Cambodia on April 30: 30-kilometer strip and limited to the end of June



violent protests on American campuses: Kent State University on May 4.

Impact of Enemy's War on U.S.

“Hanoi uses time the way the Russians used terrain before Napoleon’s advance on Moscow, always retreating, losing every battle, but eventually creating conditions in which the enemy can no longer function. For Napoleon, his long supply lines and the cold Russian winter; . . . for us it will be the mounting dissension, impatience, and frustration caused by a protracted war without fronts or other visible signs of success; a growing need to choose between guns and butter; and an increasing American repugnance of finding, for the first time, their country cast as ‘the heavy’ with massive fire power brought to bear against a ‘small Asian nation.’” (Nicholas Katzenbach, Undersecretary of State, 1967)



May 4, 1970




Spring 1971, Nixon sought the initiative in the war.

South Vietnamese forces crossed into Cambodia and Laos in early February 1971.

North Vietnamese anticipated the incursion into Laos, known as Lam Son 719, and massed forces in an attempt to annihilate the South Vietnamese.


South Vietnamese withdrew in a disorderly retreat.



COSVN

The Cambodian Incursions 1970

April 28-July 22,
1970



Nixon wanted a dilemma for the Soviets and Chinese—give them “bigger fish to fry,” in his phrase: support of North Vietnam or closer relationship with the United States.

1972 summits in Beijing and Moscow but material support of Hanoi continued.

Easter Offensive – March 1972:

Three-pronged North Vietnamese offensive

Expected victory to lead to success in negotiations.

Nixon --


Sent massive air force and naval reinforcements.

Began mining of North Vietnam's harbors.

Began sustained air offensive against North:

Operation Linebacker.

= stymied North Vietnam's offensive, leading to Politburo's engagement in serious negotiations.



November 7, 1972 – Presidential election (Nixon v. McGovern)

October 11–12, 1972 -- Kissinger and Le Duc Tho reached agreement.

Rejected by President Nguyen Van Thieu:

Left North Vietnamese forces in South Vietnam.

Legitimized the Provisional Revolutionary Government.

Forced Kissinger to resume negotiations.

FIFTY CENTS

APRIL 1, 1974

TIME

HOW HENRY DOES IT





+ Renewed negotiations = no common ground

**+ December 14, 1972: "Christmas Bombing"
(Linebacker II) --massive B-52 attacks**

**+ intense pressure on Thieu: threats to cut off
economic, military, political support of South Vietnam**

January 8, 1973:

negotiations resumed.

January 23:

United States and DRVN initialed agreement.

January 27:

peace agreement signed.



Nixon promised U.S. military support if North Vietnam violated accords.

November 14, 1972: “I repeat my personal assurances to you that the United States will react very strongly and rapidly to any violation of the agreement.”

understood to mean the recommitment of B-52s.


THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 9, 1974

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I hereby resign the Office of President of the
United States.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Richard Nixon". The signature is written in dark ink and is positioned below the typed name "Richard Nixon".



American prisoners of war returned.


The war continued.

American commitments not upheld—

**+ domestic and Congressional reluctance
to re-engage**

+ economic constraints

**+ Watergate scandal (weakened and
distracted Nixon)**



March 1975 -- Major offensive in Central Highlands.

April 30, 1975 -- NVA tanks rolled through the gate of the Presidential Palace in Saigon.

A hopeless, unwinnable endeavor?

Or

A war that should have been won if not for:

→ the protesters?

→ the president and Congress?

→ the military?

"...THERE ARE SEVERAL COURSES THAT COULD BE FOLLOWED. WE COULD SEND OUR OWN DIVISIONS... OR WE COULD PULL OUT AND SAY, 'TO HELL WITH YOU...'
OR WE CAN SAY THIS IS THE VIETNAMESE'S WAR... AND WE CAN TRAIN THEM HOW TO FIGHT... AND THAT, AFTER CONSIDERING ALL OF THESE, IT SEEMS THE LATTER OFFERS THE BEST ALTERNATIVE FOR AMERICA TO FOLLOW."

- LBJ, MARCH 2, 1964



Bart.
ARTIZANS.COM

LBJ wanted

a limited war

with limited resources

in a limited geographic area

for limited diplomatic

objectives.

(McNamara, *Argument*, 334)

Should the United States have been in Vietnam?

Was its security at stake?

Was Vietnam part of an international (communist) threat to the U.S.?

Was it a fixable (winnable) situation?

Could the United States have won?

Did it correctly identify its enemy?

Was there a strategy for defeating this enemy?

Would its enemy have accepted anything short of victory?

Did the United States fail to achieve its objective because of its strategy? American protesters? Government leaders (primarily Lyndon Johnson and Congress)?

Robert McNamara's
“eleven major causes for
our disaster in Vietnam”

In Retrospect (1995)



1. We misjudged . . . the geopolitical intentions of our adversaries . . . , and we exaggerated the dangers to the United States of their actions.
2. We viewed the people and leaders of South Vietnam in terms of our own experiences [and values]. . .
3. We underestimated the power of nationalism to motivate a people . . . to fight and die for their beliefs and values

4. Our misjudgments of friend and foe alike reflected **our profound ignorance of the history, culture, and politics of the people of the area, and the personalities and habits of their leaders. . . .**

5. We failed . . . to recognize **the limitations of modern, high-technology military equipment, forces, and doctrine in confronting unconventional, highly motivated people's movements.** We failed as well to adapt our military tactics **to the task of winning the hearts and minds of people from a totally different culture.**

6. We failed to draw Congress and the American people into a full and frank discussion and debate of the pros and cons of large-scale U.S. military involvement . . .

7. After the action got under way and unanticipated events forced us off our planned course, we failed to retain popular support in part because we did not explain fully what was happening and why we were doing what we did. . . .

8. We did not recognize that neither our people nor our leaders are omniscient. **Where our own security is not directly at stake, our judgment of what is in another people's or country's best interest should be put to the test of open discussion in international forums. We do not have the God-given right to shape every nation in our own image or as we choose.**
9. We did not hold to the principle that [such] U.S. military action . . . should be carried out only in conjunction with multinational forces **supported fully . . . by the international community.**

10. We failed to recognize that in international affairs . . . **there may be problems for which there are no immediate solutions.** . . . [W]e may have to live with an imperfect, untidy world.

11. Underlying many of these errors lay our failure to organize the top echelons of the executive branch to deal effectively with **the extraordinarily complex range of political and military issues . . . associated with the application of military force under substantial constraints** over a long period of time.

PLACES -
Events Different (but similar)

VIETNAM

- 1 sought exit strategy
- 2 Gorilla warfare
- 3 unpopular in the U.S. and around the world
- 4 substantial civilian and U.S. troop casualties
- 5 costly



IRAQ

- 1 Seeking exit strategy
- 2 Gorilla warfare
- 3 unpopular in the U.S. and around the world
- 4 substantial civilian and U.S. troop casualties
- 5 costly



Shaped
much
different

#D FISCHER





Prop up inept, corrupt government.
Fail to grasp local culture & history.
Fail to win civilian hearts & minds.
(accidentally killing lots of them helps)
Continually send mixed signals.
Be seen mainly as a foreign occupier.
Underestimate your enemies' skills.

You can't spell
AFGHANISTAN
without
A, G, A, I and N

Search ID: sgen202



SPINBERG

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GIMBLE © 2001 THE FLORIDA TIMES-UNION

Vietnam, minus the jungle

Afghanistan Is Spelled V-I-E-T-N-A-M

VIETNAM-ISTAN

'Vietnam without napalm'

Afghanistan, a jungle-less Vietnam


Dover



AGAINISTAN

EXIT STRATEGY

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
EXIT IRAQ

LOOK AT THE BRIGHT LIGHT IN THERE...



IRAQ: NOT ANOTHER VIETNAM!

HEY! I SEE A
LIGHT AT THE END
OF THE TUNNEL
ALREADY!...



I THINK WE'RE FIGHTING
FOR OPEN TRIBALISM, FREE
OPIUM TRADE AND THE BASIC
RIGHT OF EVERY CITIZEN
NOT TO VOTE...

FEWER THAN
40% VOTE

AFGHANISTAN

moil

